which third party institutions (especially domestic courts, independent agencies, and international courts) have authority "to implement, interpret, and apply the rules; to resolve disputes; and (possibly) to make further rules." 12 In broad terms, one may describe the differing attitudes of domestic courts toward international law based on their tendency to adopt either "harmonization techniques" or "avoidance techniques." 13 The former term covers a wide variety of practices domestic courts employ to give effect to international norms in their domestic legal systems. The latter term describes a range of contrasting techniques some domestic courts have devised "to by-pass otherwise (i.e. under their own constitutional arrangements) applicable international legal
provisions." 14 The most potent "harmonization technique" is a decision by a domestic court that a particular international norm is binding as formal law in the domestic legal system. But some courts also have given effect to international norms that do not formally qualify as domestic law.
In this vein, courts have given effect to unincorporated treaties, applied interpretive presumptions to ensure conformity of domestic statutes with international law, and even relied on international norms in constitutional interpretation. Courts inclined to special "friendliness" 15 to international 12 Sandholtz and Sweet describe this phenomenon as a continuum founded on the extent to which rules are "formal precise, and authoritative" and are "tied to organizational supports, including enforcement mechanisms." Wayne Sandholtz & Alec Stone Sweet, Law, Politics, and International Governance 239-242, in THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Christian Reus-Smit, ed., 2004). 13 See Preliminary Report: Principles on Engagement of Domestic Courts with International Law 6-9 (ILA Study Group, 2013)(employing these terms to describe the variations in the application of international law by domestic courts). 14 Id., at 7. 15 The term "friendliness to international law" often is attributed to Antonio Cassese, Modern Constitutions and International Law, III Academie de Droit International, Recueil des Cours (1985) 331, 343. law also have found fertile ground for the development of domestic law in existing (and even developing) rules of customary international law.
When, in contrast, courts resort to "avoidance techniques" they relegate claims founded in international law to politics or diplomacy. 16 For example, some courts have recognized a "political question" doctrine for issues with particularly important or sensitive foreign policy implications. 17 A narrow conception of "standing" or "justiciability" may severely circumscribe the pool of permitted claimants. Some courts also have afforded deference to the executive branch in interpreting international legal norms. Additionally, courts in some countries apply the doctrine of "non-self-executing" treaties as an avoidance technique. These and related avoidance techniques carry particular significance for the theme of this volume, for they enable domestic courts to weigh political considerations in the application of international norms to specific disputes.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SUBJECT MATTER: HORIZONTAL, VERTICAL, AND TRANSNATIONAL RULES
The introductory chapter to this volume suggests that the relationship between politics and international law varies across stages of governance and governance systems. It also notes that "different systems of governance are demarcated by their subject matter, their scope, or both." 18 Our analysis reveals that the relative influence of law and politics in the attitudes of domestic courts toward international law varies considerably across subject matter. That is, the willingness of national courts to view an international issue as one of law-and thus within their 16 See Eyal Benvenisti, Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Uses of Foreign and International Law by National Courts, (2008) 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 241, 242. 17 The leading United States Supreme Court case on the subject rejected the notion that all cases that involve foreign affairs implicate the political question doctrine. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) . 18 See Chapter One, p. __.
realm of authority notwithstanding the political implications-depends heavily on the subject matter of the legal rule involved. Specifically, judicial behavior varies depending on whether an international legal rule regulates the "horizontal" relations between states, the cross-border "transnational" relations between private actors, or the "vertical" relations between states and private actors.
Horizontal Rules. Part II analyzes the role of domestic courts in applying legal rules that govern relations between and among sovereign states. This is the traditional realm of interstate diplomacy dominated by political considerations and national interest.
International law rules governing horizontal relations may be both highly obligatory and highly precise. An arms control treaty with detailed limits on armaments represents a good example. But even when international law has these attributes, Part II describes a strong presumption that the sovereign states involved have not delegated enforcement authority to national courts. The main exception involves rules protecting the jurisdictional immunity of states in domestic courts.
Transnational Rules.
Part III then examines the sharply divergent judicial attitude toward "transnational" legal rules: international norms that regulate cross-border legal relations between private actors. As one of us observed, disputes on this plane "rarely have sufficient political salience to become the subject of interstate diplomacy." 19 The benefits of uniform law for crossborder private transactions nonetheless have led states to adopt wide-ranging international norms governing transnational relationships, including multilateral treaties in commercial law, civil procedure, arbitration, family law, and aviation law, among others. 20 We have participated in some of those projects. 21 We provide a brief review of the principal system types here to set a context for the more detailed analysis that follows.
Nearly every constitutional system contains rules for the making and ratification of treaties. Some-especially more modern ones-contain express provisions on the subject.
22
Nearly fifty include references to the domestic legal force of specific treaties, especially on human rights. 23 Other constitutional structures, especially those that follow the British parliamentary system, have established conventions on the subject. 24 Some constitutions, though substantially fewer, also include express references to customary international law.
25
It is common in this context to draw a distinction between so-called "dualist" and "monist" approaches to international law. Theoretical debates aside, we use those terms to describe two broad types of domestic legal systems. The fundamental issue that divides the two is whether international norms have the status of law in the domestic legal system.
Treaty law provides the clearest illustration of the distinction. This volume analyzes the relationship between law and politics based on five "stages of governance." On two of these stages, domestic courts are frequent and substantial players.
Interpretation of legal norms is an essential function of an independent judiciary. Domestic courts also play an important role in the implementation of international law by issuing authoritative judgments in litigated disputes. These two subjects occupy much of our attention in this chapter.
For the remaining three stages of governance, in contrast, the influence of domestic courts is more limited. From their constitutional station and institutional competence, domestic courts have only a circumscribed role in international law rule-making. In a formal sense, states make treaties, and courts are not empowered to adjust the substance to advance broader interests.
In some systems the common law opens a channel for the recognition of norms of customary international law. As a more general matter, a "transjudicial dialogue" may foster epistemic communities for the recognition of such norms. But here as well, a faithful adherence to the judicial function places constraints on judges making, as opposed to finding, the law. A rare exception may be on the subject of conduct-based immunity of former government officials for acts of torture committed while in office.
31
A distinct stage of governance involves decision-making by the subjects of legal rules.
Courts are not generally the subjects of international legal norms-beyond the general obligation of a state institution to apply the law created by the political branches. However, some international rules target proceedings in domestic courts themselves. In sum, the court described the relevant legal rules as horizontal rules that "govern relations between states" and it characterized the underlying conduct as "the manifestation of a political function." These two ideas -that the rule is horizontal and that the function is political -are closely related. The plaintiffs thought they were asking the court to apply a vertical rule of Republic of Argentina, the issuer of sovereign bonds. 41 Argentina had waived its immunity from jurisdiction. However, NML could not execute the judgment because Argentina did not waive its immunity from attachment. In an attempt to collect the money it was owed, NML undertook a global search for Argentine assets subject to attachment. 42 When an Argentine warship docked at a port in Ghana, NML tried to attach the warship to collect on the prior judgment. A lower court granted an attachment order and seized the vessel. 43 At this point, the dispute was effectively jurisdiction over Argentina in Ghana's domestic courts. 44 The Supreme Court of Ghana remedied the breach by reversing the attachment order.
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Chapter One identifies "decision-making" as a stage of governance in which "the actors whose behavior is governed by a rule" make decisions on the basis of that rule. 46 State immunity rules are unusual because domestic courts are key actors governed by those rules-in a practical sense, if not a formal sense. The Supreme Court of Ghana effectively implemented the international immunity rule by reversing the attachment order. 47 The Ghanaian Court's decision is similar to the Italian court's decision in Markovic, in that both courts relied on jurisdictional rules to avoid the merits of the underlying dispute. However, the Ghanaian Court applied the international immunity rule to justify its jurisdictional decision, whereas the Italian court applied a domestic jurisdictional rule to avoid application of the international (IHL) rule.
III. TRANSNATIONAL RULES
The governance system for transnational legal rules in domestic courts is strikingly different from that for horizontal rules. For rules governing disputes between private parties, domestic courts play an active role almost irrespective of the salience of political interests. In this respect, the governance system for transnational rules in domestic courts differs even from "vertical" legal rules with significant effects on private interests. 44 See Argentina v. Ghana (The ARA Libertad Case), International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea, No. 20. 45 Republic v. High Court, supra note 45. 46 See Chapter one, p. __. 47 The government of Ghana released the ship before the Supreme Court of Ghana issued its ruling, but the Supreme Court decision validated the legality of the government's action.
As noted in Part One, the predominant model of governance for transnational legal rules is "judicialization." 48 In this realm, domestic courts commonly assume-often without detailed analysis-that they have enforcement authority even if the relevant norms may touch on political sensitivities, are highly imprecise, or involve substantial discretion. The result is that courts routinely apply, interpret, and develop transnational norms in the disputes before them.
The Significance of Multilateral Treaties.
Historically, customary norms predominated in transnational private relations in areas such as commercial and maritime law. As A. Claire Cutler has exhaustively demonstrated, however, since the nineteenth century domestic statutory and common law have displaced the private customary law of the lex mercatoria. treaties cover other aspects of commercial and family law, as well as civil procedure and other private law subjects. 48 See A. Claire Cutler, PRIVATE POWER AND GLOBAL AUTHORITY 2 (CUP 2003)(citing a trend toward "the juridification of political, social, and economic life"). 49 See id. at 141-179.
The practical significance of these transnational treaties finds expression in the fact that the distinction between dualist and hybrid monist states becomes almost entirely irrelevant in this realm. "Scheduling" is a common means for the incorporation of such treaties in dualist states. 
The Preeminence of Law over Politics
The primary theme of this volume is that the relative influence of law and politics varies according to the sites in which their relationship unfolds. At the site of domestic court application of transnational legal norms, law predominates over politics in nearly every respect.
The realm of transnational private relations is highly "legalized." Thus, the permissible grounds for argumentation by disputants (the "argumentation frameworks") 60 are legal (not political) in source, form, and content. Litigants and judges alike revert to "the text, purpose, and history of the rules, their interpretation, admissible exceptions, applicability to classes of situations, and particular facts." 61 Likewise, the dominant model of judicial decision-making is "legal." 62 Judges cite transnational treaties "because they contain relevant law and interpretive guidelines" that are binding in the domestic legal system. Theories of "attitudinal" judging (i.e., based on political or ideological preferences) or "strategic" judging (i.e., to satisfy the interests of other institutional actors such as the executive, the legislature, or public opinion) are of minimal relevance. 63 The contrast with horizontal, and even many vertical, rules in this respect is striking. Custody decisions are often difficult. Judges must strive always to avoid a common tendency to prefer their own society and culture [.] International law serves a high purpose when it underwrites the determination by nations to rely upon their domestic courts to enforce just laws by legitimate and fair proceedings. 65 The touchstone nonetheless remains legal, as the Court emphasized in a recent opinion applying the same treaty. In a marked departure from its reliance on procedural default rules in disputes over the Vienna Consular Convention, the Court declared that it was "unwilling to apply equitable tolling principles that would, in practice, rewrite the treaty." of returning under that treaty. 69 The CISG also repeatedly defines rights or obligations by what is "reasonable" or "unreasonable" under the circumstances. 70 And the New York Convention grants exceptions based on an absence of "proper notice" or "public policy." 71 Numerous similar examples exist in other transnational treaties. Notwithstanding such highly imprecise norms, domestic courts routinely adopt the "legal" model of judicial decision-making. They interpret and apply the treaties as binding legal norms-even if doing so requires the exercise of substantial judicial discretion.
Domestic courts also do so in situations of high political salience. Granted, transnational legal rarely touch on political nerves in an appreciable way (compared to horizontal and vertical rules). Disputes involving transnational rules simply are too numerous or mundane for the executive branch to assert its policy preferences on a regular basis. Moreover, the competing interests often cut across the political divide: A buyer or seller in an international sale is equally likely to be a member of one political party as another; so too is a father or mother in an international child custody dispute. As a result, the political branches commonly are content to leave the resolution of the related legal issues to the courts. As should be clear from the preceding discussion, judicial avoidance doctrines have played a quite limited role in the realm of transnational legal relations. One finds here almost no mention of political question, non-justiciability, or similar doctrines. Likewise, the debate over whether particular treaty provisions are "self-executing" or have "direct effect" simply has not featured prominently in transnational disputes. Most domestic courts do not grant deference to the executive branch in treaty interpretation. 78 Although United States courts use the rhetoric of deference in transnational disputes, 79 little evidence exists that the executive branch has exercised political influence over judicial decisions.
Domestic Court Engagement and the Stages of Governance.
As noted in Part One, domestic courts generally do not play an active role in rule-making or decision-making regarding international legal norms. But for transnational legal rules, domestic courts have noteworthy influence in interpretation, implementation, and progressive development over time.
The role of domestic courts in the interpretation of transnational legal norms is expansive and significant. The influence of domestic courts has become most pronounced through the process of developing an international consensus on the meaning of treaty provisions. delegated authority to engage in "dynamic treaty interpretation." 91 The result is that domestic courts have the power (whether formally or practically) to effect legal change in fulfillment of the fundamental purposes of transnational treaties. 95 IHL can be divided broadly into three sets of rules: a) rules governing the means and methods of warfare; b) rules governing the treatment of detainees in armed conflict; and c) rules related to administration of occupied territory. Domestic courts tend to view cases involving means and methods of warfare as horizontal cases, whereas they tend to view cases in the other two categories as vertical cases. 96 This formulation encompasses cases where private actors raise international law defenses in actions initiated by the government, as well as cases where private plaintiffs bring civil suits against government actors.
IV. VERTICAL RULES
provisions; and (3) "direct application," where courts apply international law directly as a rule of decision. Each of these methods involves domestic courts in two prominent stages of governance: the interpretation and implementation of international law.
SILENT APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
When judges apply domestic legal rules, they often do so without acknowledging that those "domestic" rules are derived from international norms. Several countries adopted new Constitutions in the decades after World War II. Many of those new Constitutions include Bill of Rights provisions that were heavily influenced by international human rights instruments. its obligations under the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. 100 The U.S. Supreme
Court has occasionally referenced international sources expressly in an effort to harmonize its interpretation of the statute with the nation's international legal obligations. 101 In most cases, though, U.S. courts apply the statute without reference to the Protocol or other international legal authorities. 102 The courts' narrow focus on the statute may sometimes create discrepancies between international and domestic rules. However, in many cases, straightforward application of the domestic statute on its own terms promotes harmony with the international norm because
Congress incorporated the international norm into the statute. 103 It is impossible to measure the harmonizing effects of different methods for domestic application of international law, but incorporation of international law into domestic constitutional and statutory provisions is undoubtedly one of the more effective techniques for entrenching international law in the realm of "law," rather than "politics."
INDIRECT APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

International Law in Statutory Interpretation
Indirect application of international law as a guide to statutory interpretation is probably the most widely used overt judicial technique for harmonizing domestic law with international dualist states frequently apply the presumption to unincorporated treaties in roughly the same way that they apply it to incorporated treaties.
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One recurring issue concerns the threshold conditions necessary to trigger application of the presumption. There is broad agreement that courts may apply the presumption in cases where the statute is facially ambiguous. The Supreme Court of Canada has gone further, holding that "it is reasonable to make reference to an international agreement at the very outset of the inquiry to determine if there is any ambiguity, even latent, in the domestic legislation." 118 Former Justice
Kirby advocated a similar approach in Australia, arguing that courts should refer to international law "not only when there exists statutory ambiguity, but also where the construction of a statute would result in an interpretation contrary to international human rights standards." 119 However, the majority of the Australian High Court has rejected this approach, refusing "to endorse a wider role for [international law] in statutory interpretation other than where the legislature has clearly envisaged such a role or where there exists a clear ambiguity on the face of the statute."
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Although the presumption of conformity is a well-established principle of statutory interpretation in most countries with independent judiciaries, application of the principle is inconsistent. In most countries, careful scrutiny of judicial decisions would probably reveal numerous cases where the presumption was potentially applicable, but courts did not apply it.
121
In part, judicial failure to apply the presumption in cases where it is potentially relevant may be presumption also manifests a tendency to apply the presumption in cases where harmonization of domestic with international law yields results that the judge considers normatively appealing, and to avoid applying it in cases where harmonization with international law would yield unattractive results. For vertical rules that regulate government conduct, one might describe the latter situation as a "silent" avoidance technique-the result is that courts refuse to apply the international rule in deference to the government's interests.
In addition to applying a presumption of conformity as a guide to statutory interpretation, courts have also applied international law in cases involving judicial review of administrative action. For example, Israel's Supreme Court routinely applies Geneva Convention IV (GC IV) to review the legality of actions by military authorities in the Occupied Territories. 122 The court has justified judicial application of GC IV-even though it has no formal status as law in Israel-by invoking the government's declared commitment to "respect the humanitarian provisions of the [R]atification of a convention is a positive statement by the executive government of this country to the world and to the Australian people that the executive government and its agencies will act in accordance with the Convention. The positive statement is an adequate foundation for a legitimate expectation, absent statutory or executive indications to the contrary, that administrative decision-makers will act in conformity with the Convention and treat the best interests of the children as a primary consideration. 124 The International human rights law has also exerted significant influence on constitutional jurisprudence in some states that are not subject to the jurisdiction of regional human rights tribunals. 132 South Africa and India are leading examples. 133 The South African Constitution In contrast, the use of international law in constitutional interpretation has been controversial in Australia and the United States. In Australia, former Justice Kirby was a strong advocate for judicial application of international law in constitutional interpretation, but he never persuaded a majority of the High Court to adopt his preferred approach. 138 The United States Supreme Court has occasionally cited international human rights law to support its interpretation of a contested constitutional provision. In every such case, though, the majority's reliance on international law provoked a sharp dissent. 139 The contrast between India and South Africa, on one hand, and the United States and Australia, on the other, suggests that countries with newer constitutions tend to embrace the use of international human rights law in constitutional interpretation. However, countries with older constitutional traditions are more hesitant to apply international law in constitutional interpretation, unless they are subject to the jurisdiction of an international human rights tribunal.
DIRECT APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Direct Application of Treaties
In strict dualist states, direct application of treaties is not possible because treaties are not part of the domestic legal order unless the legislature enacts a statute to incorporate the treaty.
Once a treaty has been incorporated, courts apply the statute, not the treaty, at least as a formal Courts in the United States, by contrast, generally do not apply human rights treaties directly because the federal political branches have consistently inserted declarations in the instruments of ratification for human rights treaties specifying that the treaties are not selfexecuting. 146 The correct interpretation of such "NSE declarations" is contested. 147 Regardless, no U.S. court has specifically held that a human rights treaty is self-executing, and the courts have typically refrained from applying the treaties directly as rules of decision. 148 
V. CONCLUSIONS
Chapter One in this volume suggests that the relationship between politics and international law varies across stages of governance and governance systems. It notes that "different systems of governance are demarcated by their subject matter, their scope, or both."
This chapter has shown that the role of domestic courts in applying international law depends heavily on the subject matter of the international legal rule at issue-in particular, whether the rule is horizontal, transnational, or vertical.
Domestic courts typically view horizontal rules as "political," not "legal." Accordingly, domestic courts rarely apply horizontal rules. Rules governing the jurisdictional immunities of states are the most notable exception. Domestic courts routinely apply immunity rules because they are seen as legal, despite the fact that they regulate horizontal relationships between states.
Patterns of judicial enforcement and non-enforcement of horizontal rules do not differ substantially between dualist states and hybrid monist states.
In contrast, domestic courts typically view transnational rules as legal, not political.
Accordingly, courts in both dualist states and hybrid monist states routinely apply transnational rules to help resolve cross-border disputes between private parties. Although many transnational rules were part of customary international law in the nineteenth century, most of the key rules have since been codified in treaties. The political branches play an important role in incorporating transnational treaties into the domestic legal order-either by means of legislative incorporation, or by means of legislative approval for treaty ratification (in hybrid monist states).
However, once the treaty is incorporated, the political branches are largely disengaged, and domestic courts have primary responsibility for treaty implementation.
Application of vertical rules by domestic courts straddles the boundary between legal and political. If courts view a particular issue as political, they are likely to employ one of several avoidance techniques, leaving the issue to be resolved by politics. However, if courts view an issue as legal, they are likely to employ one of several harmonization techniques in an effort to harmonize domestic law with the relevant international legal rule. Several factors influence the decision between harmonization and avoidance in any particular case. Here, the distinction between dualist and hybrid monist states has little influence over the choice between harmonization and avoidance, but it does influence the particular type of harmonization or avoidance technique that courts utilize.
